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ABSTRACT: Our search model combines two search methods, the public em-
ployment service (PES) and random search. The separation rate is endogenous, 
the job matching process consists of three rounds. In the first and the second re-
spectively the short-term (STU) and the long-term unemployed (LTU) randomly 
search for a vacancy. During the last round the PES matches registered job-
seekers with registered vacancies. The LTU cause training costs and, during the 
training period, have a lower marginal product than the STU. The effects of the 
hiring subsidy and of profiling techniques to increase the effectiveness of the PES 
depend on the target group they are geared towards. For skill groups, who have 
relatively low private search costs in comparison with their productivity, not only 
the hiring subsidy but also the job placement activities of the PES are counterpro-
ductive and reduce overall employment. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Das Modell kombiniert zwei Suchmethoden, den staatlichen 
Vermittlungsdienst (PES) und die private Jobsuche. Die Trennungsrate des Mo-
dells ist endogen, der Matching Prozeß umfasst drei Phasen. In der ersten und 
zweiten suchen jeweils die Kurzzeitarbeitslosen (STU) und die Langzeitarbeit-
slosen (LTU) nach annoncierten Stellen, in der dritten vermittelt der PES registri-
erte Jobsucher mit registrierten Vakanzen. LTU verursachen Trainingskosten und 
haben während der Einarbeitungszeit eine geringere Produktivität als STU. Die 
Wirkungen des Lohnkostenzuschusses für LTU und der Maßnahmen zur 
Erhöhung der Vermittlungseffektivität des PES hängen von der Zielgruppe ab. Für 
Zielgruppen, deren private Suchkosten im Vergleich zu ihrer Arbeitsproduktivität 
relativ gering sind, erweisen sich nicht nur der Lohnkostenzuschuss sondern auch 
die staatliche Vermittlungsaktivität als kontraproduktive Instrumente, die die ge-
samtwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung reduzieren. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Millard/Mortensen (1997), Mortensen/Pissarides (1999, 2001) and Pissarides 
(2000, ch. 9) are search models which analyse the effects of active labour market 
policies (ALMP) on equilibrium unemployment. In these models, the labour market 
is characterised by a matching technology which represents the two-sided search 
process with its frictions – due to imperfect information, mobility costs and hetero-
geneities. Each new match of a job seeker with a vacancy is entitled to a hiring sub-
sidy. The hiring subsidy increases both the number of newly created jobs and the 
amount of job destruction. Therefore, its overall effect on equilibrium unemployment 
is ambiguous. Millard/Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen/Pissarides (1999, 2001) 
thus estimate the net effects of the subsidy with the help of numerical simulations.  
Our model differs from the above-mentioned in the following respects. First, two 
search methods are available, the public employment service (PES) and random 
search (Pissarides 1979). Second, ALMP is available only for the long-term unem-
ployed (LTU). A hiring subsidy is paid to firms which register their vacancy and fill it 
with a LTU worker placed by the PES. The PES also has the option to subsidise 
matches established through random search. Third, the model’s matching process 
consists of three subsequent phases. In the first and second phase respectively the 
short-term unemployed (STU) and the active job seekers among the LTU randomly 
search for a vacancy, in the third round the PES matches registered vacancies with 
the registered unemployed. Fourth, the unemployed choose between a passive and 
an active search strategy. The active LTU combine both methods of search. The 
passive unemployed wait for a placement through the PES.  
The model generates the following results. (1) Equilibrium unemployment de-
pends negatively on both unemployment incidence and duration, and on the frac-
tion of passive job seekers. (2) Moreover, the hiring subsidy increases job destruc-
tion and unemployment duration of passive job seekers, and reduces the proportion 
of active job seekers among the STU and LTU as well as the job-to-job transitions. 
As a consequence, it decreases overall employment. (3) It increases the fraction of 
the LTU, their average outside wage, and the expenses of the PES for passive and 
active measures. (4) Furthermore, the LTU must accept a wage penalty. (5) Intui-
tion - embodied for example in the German “Job-Aqtiv-law” – recommends increas-
ing the effectiveness of the public placement service in order to reduce equilibrium 
unemployment. This intuition is not confirmed by our model. (6) Strengthening the 
job seekers' bargaining power decreases equilibrium unemployment.   4 
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the equilibrium rate of unem-
ployment is derived. Section 3 introduces the asset equations of filled jobs and 
employed workers. Section 4 deals with job creation. Section 5 covers the asset 
equations of the unemployed and wage negotiations. In Section 6, the equilibrium 
values of the filled jobs, the dispersions of the outside wages of the LTU and the job 
destruction condition are derived. Section 7 presents a numerical simulation and 
section 8 provides a conclusion. The Appendix contains a graphical presentation of 
the simulation results. 
2. STEADY STATE AND HIRING SUBSIDY 
The time of the model is discrete
1. Job creation takes place at the beginning, job 
destruction at the end of a period. The search process is two-sided. A continuum of 
vacancies searches for applicants, who can be of two different types: The first type 
are the short-term unemployed (STU) who have lost their job only at the end of the 
previous period. The second type are the long-term unemployed (LTU) who have 
been without a job for one period or more. The labour force is normalised to unity. 
Of the  u − 1  employed,  () ( ) u R G I − = 1 λ  lose their job at the end of the period. 
) (R G λ  is the unemployment incidence where λ  is the probability of an idiosyncratic 
productivity shock,  () x G  with support  1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ x α  is the c.d.f. of the multiplicative 
shock x and R is the endogenous reservation productivity:  0 ≥ yx , with  0 > y , is the 
flow output of a job. If a match draws productivity x with  1 ≤ ≤ x R , worker and firm 
decide to continue the job. If  R x < , the match terminates, the job becomes vacant, 
and the worker unemployed. 
Methods and strategies of search. The model analyses the interactions of two 
search methods, the PES and random search. The search strategy of the vacan-
cies is not specialised, that is, all vacancies are simultaneously posted on the pri-
vate search market where they randomly search for a worker and are registered 
with the PES. Unemployed workers do not apply more than once per period and 
choose between an active and a passive search strategy. 
Workers who lose their job register with the PES to claim unemployment benefit 
and to avail of the job placement service often only after days or weeks have 
passed. Once the PES is involved it reviews the right to the claim, registers and ad-
                                            
1  With respect to the differentiation between the STU and the LTU a model in discrete time is to be 
preferred to a model in continuous time. It is also easier to solve. The time period which best cor-
responds to the length of a model period is the yearly quarter. On the one hand the reference pe-
riod should not be too short so as not to vary too much from the usual time limitations between 
the STU and the LTU (North America: 6 months and over, Europe: 12 months and over). On the 
other hand the reference period should not be too long because, as we assume, at least one 
model period elapses before the PES makes a first job offer to an unemployed worker.   5 
vises the unemployed worker and finally refers him to the job placement service. 
The state placement agency then looks in the available data banks for match part-
ners and makes a first job offer to the STU worker. When the addressee receives 
the offer at the end of the “reaction time” the STU worker has often already found a 
job. How much time passes between the beginning of an unemployment spell und 
the first job offer of the PES? Despite extensive research the authors of this paper 
have not found descriptive statistics on the distribution of the reaction time and 
have thus introduced the following assumption. 
In the weeks or months before the first job offer of the PES the STU are certainly 
dependent on their own search efforts in the case that they decide on the active 
search strategy. We assume in the following that at least one period lies between 
the beginning of an unemployment spell and the first job offer of the PES in which 
there is definitely no job offer. Hence, the PES can place only the LTU. Moreover, 
the STU who have chosen the passive search strategy and leave the job search up 
to the PES can only assume a job offer from the PES in the following period at the 
earliest. The active LTU use both search methods (the PES and the private search 
market) simultaneously whereas only the method of random search is available to 
the STU.  
Of the I workers who lose their job,  I S  decide in favour of the active search strat-
egy and immediately at the beginning of the next period start to search randomly for 
an unfilled vacancy. The other  0 ≥ − I S I  workers prefer the passive strategy, and, 
with the beginning of the subsequent period, they belong to the group of LTU. The 
matching technology of the search market, which is specified below, generates the 
transition probability  I p  that a given job seeker among the STU will find a vacancy. 
As the STU have a marginal product which is at least as high as that of the LTU 
and do not cause training costs, each match of a STU worker with an advertised 
vacancy results in an employment contract. Therefore, at the end of a period, the 
measure of the STU,  S u , is 
S I I u S p I = − .        (1) 
Search process. The search process consists of three phases, s. Fig. 1. In the 
first, only the  I S  active job seekers among the STU are searching. They possess 
the best information about current labour market conditions and, therefore, their ap-
plications are more targeted and arrive earlier than the placements of the PES or 
the applications of the active job seekers among the LTU. 
In the second round, advertised vacancies meet the S active job seekers among 
the LTU. Active job seekers among the LTU have the advantage that they can use 
both search methods simultaneously. Hence, in equilibrium their transition probabil-
ity is higher than that of the LTU who have chosen to wait for a placement through   6 
the PES. But using the search market generates search costs so that, in equilib-
rium, only a part of the u unemployed decide on the active search strategy. 
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Fig. 1: The search process  
In the last round of the matching process the PES arranges matches between 
registered vacancies and the registered unemployed. 
Transition probabilities. Of the pool of unemployed,  0 ≥ − S u  workers choose the 
passive search strategy and wait for a placement via the PES. Their unemployment 
duration hazard i.e. their transition probability into employment is 
() ( ) ( ) P S I T F q q P − − 1 1 , where P denotes the probability of a contact with a vacancy 
found by the PES,  I q  and  S q  are the probabilities that the vacancy is already filled 
either by one of the  I S  job seekers among the STU or by one of the S job seekers 
among the LTU. Each match with a LTU worker generates match specific training 
costs  0 ≥ t , of which ex ante only the c.d.f.  ) (t F  and the reservation costs  P T  are 
known. The reservation costs  P T  are the training costs up to which firms and the 
LTU are interested in signing a job contract. A match with a LTU worker with train-
ing costs  P T t >  is immediately dissolved again; the job remains vacant and the job 
seeker unemployed. Then,  () P T F  denotes the probability that the match partners 
face training costs  P T t ≤ , and, in a large economy,  () P T F − 1  denotes the fraction 
of the LTU who cannot be placed via the PES. 
The transition probability (or unemployment duration hazard) for the S active job 
seekers among the LTU is () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] P S S S S I T F q P p T F p q − − + − 1 1 1 . First, the lo-
cated vacancy must still be free. Second, the job seeker must draw training costs 
that are below the reservation costs of the respective search method.  S T  is the res-
ervation cost of the search market and  P T  the reservation cost of the matching 
process organised by the PES. Third, even if random search is not successful, the 
active job seekers among the LTU still have the chance to be placed through the 
PES. 
Summarising the flows into employment which result from the above transition 
probabilities and taking into account that  S u  denotes the inflow into the pool of 
(long term) unemployed u yields the steady state condition: 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) [] S T F q P T F q p u T F q q P u P S S I S P S I S − − − + − − = 1 1 1 1 .   (2)   7 
The LTU prefer the active search strategy only if the transition probability from 
combining the two methods of search is higher than that of the passive search 
strategy alone. This necessary condition for active job search is fulfilled iff 
() ( ) () P S S T F q P T F − > 1 . 
Unemployment duration. The duration of an unemployment spell depends on the 
search strategy chosen by an unemployed worker. If the worker leaves the job 
search up to the PES, then he will be unemployed for at least one period and the 
average length of time required for a job search will be: 
() ( ) ( ) P S I P T F q q P d − − + = 1 1 1 1 . If the worker chooses the active search strategy 
then immediately after losing his old job he has the opportunity to look for a new 
one, which finds him acceptable, in the job advertisements. Because the probability 
of finding a job vacancy on the market is  S p , the average duration of an unem-
ployment spell is  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] P S S S S I S S T F q P p T F p q p d − − + − − = 1 1 1 ) 1 ( . If the two 
search strategies are compared in respect to the expected duration of the unem-
ployment spell, then a job seeker who prefers the passive to the active strategy has 
to wait for at least one period longer to be matched with a new job which finds him 
acceptable,  S P d d + >1 . 
Matching function. The function  () v x m ,  represents the matching technology of 
the search market, where m is the number of contacts per period for a given meas-
ure of job seekers x and advertised vacancies v. The matching function has con-
stant returns to scale, is strictly concave and monotone in both arguments. Immedi-
ately at the beginning of a period,  () v S m I,  of the v advertised vacancies are filled 
by the STU who are actively searching. For a given vacancy posted at the begin-
ning of the period, the probability of a match with a STU worker is 
() () ( ) v v S m m q I I I , 1 , 1 = ≡ θ θ , with  I I S v = θ  denoting the tightness of the search 
market during the first round of the matching process. The transition probability of a 
given active job seeker among the STU is  () () I I I q p θ θ θ = . For convenience we write 
() I I q q θ =  and  () I I p p θ = . 
The S active job seekers in the unemployment pool u face the same v vacancies. 
(,) m S v  represents the measure of contacts, and  () ( ) ( ) v v S m m q S S , 1 , / 1 = ≡ θ θ  is the 
contact probability of a given vacancy with one of the active job seekers among the 
LTU – with  S v S = θ  denoting the tightness of the search market during the second 
round of the matching process. The contact probability of a given job seeker is 
() () S S S q p θ θ θ = , and we write  () S S q q θ =  and  () S S p p θ = . 
As all vacancies are advertised as well as registered, v is also an argument in the 
matching function  () v u M ,  of the PES, which has the same properties as  () v x m , . M 
is the measure of contacts per period which the PES brings about with v registered 
vacancies and a stock of u registered (long-term) unemployed. For a given va-
cancy, therefore,  () ( ) ( ) v v u M M Q , 1 , / 1 = Θ ≡ Θ  is the contact probability with a regis-  8 
tered LTU worker via the PES – with  u v = Θ  denoting the tightness between both 
registers of the PES. Thus, for the registered unemployed, the probability of a con-
tact with a registered vacancy is  () ) (Θ Θ = Θ Q P . 
Inserting equation (1) into equation (2), using  () ( ) u R G I − = 1 λ  and taking into ac-
count the above definitions of the tightness in the three labour market segments, we 
obtain the following equation for equilibrium unemployment in the steady state 
()
( ) () ( ) ( ) ()( ) ( ) ( ) [] {} P S S S I I P S I T F q P T F q q q T F q q P R G
R G
u
− − − + Θ + − − +
=
1 1 1 1 λ
λ
. (3) 
In a partial comparative static analysis, only the job destruction rate  G λ  and the 
reservation costs  S T  have unambiguous effects with respect to the stock of unem-
ployed (3). Unemployment increases with an increase in the separation rate and a 
decrease in the reservation costs. 
Hiring subsidy. The PES is fully integrated (OECD 1996). First, it pays unem-
ployment benefits to job seekers who have not found a job at the end of a period. 
Second, it matches registered vacancies with registered job seekers, and third it 
pursues active labour market policies (ALMP). In this last function, the PES pays a 
hiring subsidy to firms that enter into an employment contract with a LTU worker. 
The hiring subsidy is paid when the match partners sign the contract and incur the 
training costs  0 ≥ t . The hiring subsidy compensates, de facto or de jure, for the 
training costs which can be monitored by the PES without costs. Since the support 
of the distribution of training costs is not bounded from above, the PES defines a 
limit H on the hiring subsidy so that all matches with  H t ≤  receive a full repayment 
of t, whereas matches with  0 > − H t  have to finance the balance out of the match 
rent. 
3. FILLED JOBS 
Each match combines a vacant job with a job seeker. The partners of a new con-
tact first determine the match specific training costs t. If t exceeds the reservation 
costs, the agents separate immediately. Otherwise, they negotiate the conditions of 
the employment contract and start production thereafter.  
An employment contract  () [] R x w wi , ,  has three components. The first is the out-
side wage  i w  which is paid to the worker throughout the initial period, the training 
period. It depends on his status i as a job seeker - on whether he is a STU worker 
with  I i =  or a LTU worker who has opted either for the passive,  P i = , or the active 
search strategy (which combines the two methods of search),  S i = . The second 
component of the contract are the match specific inside wages represented by the 
wage function  []ℜ → 1 , : R w  that obtains after any productivity shock during the   9 
continuation periods. After each shock to the match specific productivity, worker 
and firm renegotiate the conditions of the employment contract, especially the 
wage
2. The third component defines the reservation threshold R at which the job 
will be destroyed.  
Continuation periods. After the training period all jobs have the same productivity 
y. Productivity shocks hit a match with probability  0 ≥ λ , are match specific, and 
manifest in the multiplicative productivity component x, which is a random variable 
with c.d.f.  () x G  defined on  [] 1 , α ∈ x . Within each period only one productivity shock 
can occur. Furthermore, the sequence of shocks are iid. 
Let  () x Π  be the present value of a filled job after the manifestation of a shock 
[] 1 , α ∈ x . Worker and firm, considering their reservation utility, are both interested in 
continuing the match as long as  () 0 ≥ x Π  and agree on job destruction as soon as 
() 0 < x Π . Since  () x Π  is a continuously monotonically increasing function of x, as 
will be shown below, a reservation threshold R exists, for which 
() 0 = R Π .        (4) 
Only jobs with  R x ≥  will be continued. We assume that the firm markets the out-
put yx at the end of the period at the same time as it pays the bargained wage 
() x w . Then the steady state equation for the present value  () x Π  of a filled job is 






 − + + − = ∫
1
1
R x h dG h x w yx x Π λ Π λ ρ Π .     (5) 
Flow and stock variables are discounted at the rate  ρ , where  1 1 1 0 < + = < r ρ  
with the interest rate  0 > r . With probability λ  the job is hit by a productivity shock 
and changes into a state h. If  1 ≤ ≤ h R  the match is continued and the continuation 
asset value becomes  () h Π . With probability  λ − 1  the match specific productivity 
does not change. 
A worker who is employed at the match specific productivity yx gets the wage 
() x w , and his human capital has the present value  () x W . The asset pricing equa-
tion for  () x W  is  






 − + 


 + + = ∫ x W U R G h dG h W x w x W
R I λ λ ρ 1
1
.     (6) 
With probability λ  a shock occurs and the match draws the productivity h. If 
R h ≥ , the value of the worker is  () h W  and the match continues. If, on the other 
                                            
2   Mortensen/Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) present a discussion of objections against 
the plausibility of this assumptin and the two-tier wage structure which results from the possibility 
of renegotiation.   10 
hand,  R h < , which occurs with probability  () R G , the job is destroyed, the worker 
becomes short-term unemployed and the value of his human capital is  I U . 
Training period. Firms choose the initial productivity when they set up the match 
and negotiate the outside wage. If the job seeker is a STU worker, the initial pro-
ductivity is set at  1 = x . Moreover, the STU do not generate training costs and 
therefore the initial value  I Π  of a job filled by a STU worker is 






 − + + − = ∫
1
1 1
R I I h dG h w y Π λ Π λ ρ Π ,      (7) 
with  I w  denoting the negotiated wage. If the match is not hit by a shock, the 
worker’s productivity remains at  1 = x  in the continuation period as well, and the 
filled job has the value  () 1 Π . The human capital of a worker who starts production 
as a STU worker is 






 − + 


 + + = ∫ 1 1
1
W U R G h dG h W w W
R I I I λ λ ρ ,     (8) 
where  () 1 W  denotes the value of the worker in the continuation period if no pro-
ductivity shock occurs. 
The LTU find a vacancy either through random search or via the PES. When 
wage negotiations between a vacancy and a LTU worker start, jobs filled by the 
STU are already productive. Moreover, the LTU need a training period and, there-
fore, their initial productivity yz is lower than the productivity of a STU worker,  1 ≤ z . 
The allocation of the training costs and the hiring subsidy is subject to negotiation, 
but the outside wage  () t wi  and the initial value of the job  () t i Π  depend only on t if 
t exceeds the subsidy limit H. For the sake of brevity, we present the asset equa-
tions only for the case  0 ≥ − H t τ , where the indicator variable  takes the value of 
one if  P i = . For a job which is filled with an active job seeker among the LTU  S i =  
and  {} 1 , 0 ∈ =ι τ , with  1 = ι  if the PES also subsidises the matches via the search 
market, otherwise  0 = ι . Considering the status of the job seeker  S P i , = , the pre-
sent value of a job filled with a LTU worker is given by 






 − + + − = ∫
1
1 1
R i i h dG h t w yz t Π λ Π λ ρ Π , for  i T t H ≤ ≤ τ .   (9) 
Taking into account the negotiated outside wage  ) (t wi , the present value of the 
worker's human capital during the training period is 










 + + = ∫ 1 1
1
W U R G h dG h W x w x W
R I i i λ λ ρ , for  i T t H ≤ ≤ τ .   (10)   11 
4. JOB CREATION AND RESERVATION COSTS 
All vacancies are advertised and registered, no vacancy specialises in one of the 
two search methods
3. Entrance into the labour market is free for all vacancies, but 
open only at the beginning of a period. The flow of vacancies therefore persists until 
the present value of a vacancy is driven to zero,  0 = V . Considering this infinitely 
elastic supply of vacancies, the job creation condition is  () I I I I V q q k − + + − = 1 0 Π , 
where k denotes the flow costs for advertising and for registration with the PES. If 
there is no contact with a STU worker in the first round of the matching process - an 
event which has the probability  I q − 1  - the vacancy takes on the value  0 > I V . 
There are three reasons for the existence of the outside option  I V . First, vacan-
cies are not specialised. Second, the matching process consists of three rounds. A 
vacancy that is not filled during the first has the option to meet a LTU worker who is 
actively searching for a job or placed by the PES in the second or third round of the 
matching process respectively. The value of this option is  I V . Third, the supply of 
vacancies is perfectly inelastic in the last two rounds of the matching process.  
The above job creation condition can also be interpreted as follows. Due to 
search costs, each successful match generates a positive rent, which is distributed 
between worker and firm through the wage.  I I V − Π  is the firm’s share of the rent of 
a match with a STU worker,  I Π  is the value of the filled job, and  I V  is the value of 
the outside option of the vacancy. The price which the firm pays for participating in 
the matching process is k, the implicit price for the first round is  I V k − . Thus, the 
job creation condition states that the flow of vacancies into the labour market lasts 
until the implicit search cost a firm has to incur to take part in the first round of the 








Π .         ( 1 1 )  
The option value  I V  of a vacancy at the end of the first round of the matching 
process, when the search costs k are sunk, is 
() [] P S S S S I QV T F q V q V − + = 1 ,        ( 1 2 )  
where  S q  denotes the probability that the vacancy will be filled by a LTU worker 
who is actively seeking.  S V  is the conditional expected value of a job which has 
contact with such a worker. If the vacancy does not meet such a worker or if the 
                                            
3   Specialisation may occur due to the heterogeneity of the job seekers or the jobs or because of 
increasing search costs. We assume that the search cost function of a vacancy with respect to 
the two search methods is sub-additive, so that, considering the asset value of a vacancy, it is 
advantageous for firms to offer vacancies through both channels.   12 
training costs of the applicant exceed  S T  – a composite event with the probability 
() S S T F q − 1  – then the vacancy still has the third option to meet a LTU worker 
placed by the PES. The probability of a match with a LTU worker placed by the 
PES is Q, and the conditional option value of the job is  P V
4. 
Reservation costs. The hiring subsidy of the PES compensates for the training 
costs up to the limit H. Matches with the LTU placed by the PES and with training 
costs t higher than H must finance the balance  0 ≥ − H t  out of the match rent. The 
allocation of the balance is part of the contract negotiations, and the value of the 
filled job,  () t P Π , therefore depends on t. As will be shown,  () t P Π  is a monotoni-
cally increasing function of t, while the net value of the job,  () t H t P − + Π , is a con-
traction and fulfils the reservation property with respect to t. Hence, reservation 
costs  P T  exist, with 
() H T T P P P + = Π .        ( 1 3 )  
Match partners whose training costs are lower than  P T  sign an employment con-
tract while match partners with  P T t >  separate immediately. 
A vacancy filled by a LTU worker who is actively searching has the value  () t S Π  if 
the match draws training costs t, with  0 ≥ − H t ι . In view of the third round of the 
matching process,  P QV  is the outside option of the firm. Therefore, the job will only 
be filled if its net value is at least as high as the value of the option to meet a LTU 
worker placed by the PES,  () P S QV t H t ≥ − +ι Π . Since the net value of the job has 
the reservation property, reservation costs  S T  also exist for the method of random 
search 
() P S S S QV H T T − + = ι Π .        ( 1 4 )  
5. THE VALUE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE NEGOTIATIONS 
A worker who has lost his job must decide between the active and the passive 
search strategy. The worker chooses the strategy which maximises the present 
value of his human capital  I U  
() () () {} U b p W p c U b U I I I I I + − + + − + = ρ ρ 1 , max ,    (15) 
where  l U b b b + =  is the gross unemployment benefit. The choice set of the 
Bellman equation (15) contains two alternatives. First, if the worker prefers the pas-
sive strategy, he receives the exogeneous unemployment benefit  U b  at the end of 
                                            
4   Appendix AI contains the asset pricing equations for  S V  and  P V .   13 
the period and enjoys utility of leisure  l b , while his human capital takes on the 
value U
5. In the subsequent period he has to decide again whether to wait for a 
placement via the PES or to search and apply for a vacancy on the market. In the 
first case, the value of his human capital is  P U , in the second, it is  S U . The worker 
will opt for the search strategy that maximises the present value of his human capi-
tal so that 
{} S P U U U , max = .        ( 1 6 )  
Second, if the STU worker chooses to search randomly, he incurs search costs 
0 > I c . With probability  I p , he will locate a vacancy, and the value of his human 
capital is  I W . With probability  I p − 1  his search will be in vain, he receives the gross 
unemployment benefit b, and his human capital takes on the value U.  
The present value of the human capital of a LTU worker who waits for a place-
ment via the PES is 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] ()
() [] () ( ) () U b P U b q q q
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If the LTU worker is matched and if the vacancy for which he applies is not yet 
filled – the probability for this composite event is  () ( ) S I q q P − − 1 1  – the value of his 
human capital is  P W  provided that the subsidy compensates fully for his training 
costs, that is if  0 ≤ − H t . Otherwise, if his training costs exceed H but are lower 
than the reservation costs  P T , the integral in (17) denotes the expected value of the 
employed human capital. If the training costs exceed  P T , vacancy and applicant 
separate, and the present value of the worker is  () U b + ρ  as in the cases where the 
vacancy is already filled or the LTU is not offered a vacancy by the PES. 
If the LTU worker decides on the active search strategy, he will incur search costs 
0 > S c . Considering the contact probability  S p  generated by the search market, the 
value of his human capital is  S U  with 
( ) ( ) () () ( ) []
() P S
P I P S
T
H S S I S S S
U p
















If the job search fails – either because the LTU worker is confronted with a va-
cancy already filled or because he incurs training costs that exceed  S T  or because 
                                            
5   For simplicity we assume that  U b is exogenous. The endogenisation of  U b (Mortensen / Pis-
sarides 2001) lowers the incentive to search and thus strengthens the comparative static effects 
of H, which are shown in Section 7.   14 
he does not find a vacancy – his human capital takes on the value of the passive 
strategy  P U  because placement via the PES is the final option which concludes the 
matching process. 
Wage negotiations. Job search takes time and causes search costs. Therefore, 
each match generates a positive monopoly rent which is distributed between the 
match partners through the wage. The distribution rules are obtained according to 
the generalised Nash solution to a bargaining problem, with  () 1 , 0 ∈ β  denoting the 
bargaining strength of the job seeker. 
If a STU worker meets a vacancy, the outside wage  I w  for the initial period of the 
match is derived from the sharing rule  






,        ( 1 9 )  
with  I V  denoting the reservation value of the vacancy, which follows from the 
firm’s option to fill the vacant job with a LTU worker during the subsequent rounds 
of the matching process. 
If the vacancy meets a LTU worker, the sharing rule depends on the design of 
ALMP, whether the PES compensates fully for the training costs, or whether the 
agents have to negotiate the allocation of the balance  0 ≥ − H t τ . For the sake of 
brevity, we present the sharing rules for the case  0 ≥ − H t τ . For wage negotiations 
with a LTU worker who is randomly searching the sharing rule is  
() () () [] P S S S QV t H t U t W − − +
−




, for  S T t H ≤ ≤ ι ,   (20) 
where  () S S U t W −  is the job seeker’s share of the rent, and  P QV  is the expected 
reservation value of the vacancy given the third round of the matching process. For 
wage negotiations with a LTU worker placed by the PES the following sharing rule 
is implemented: 






, for  P T t H ≤ ≤ ,   (21) 
where  () t H t P − + Π  is the firm’s share of the rent. Taking into account the idio-
syncratic productivity shock  [] 1 , R x ∈ , the value of a STU worker,  I U , and the fact 
that in equilibrium the asset price of a vacancy is  0 = V , the sharing rule used for 
the negotiations with an insider is 






.       ( 2 2 )    15 
Considering the asset pricing equations (5) – (10) and the sharing rules (19) – 
(22), we obtain 
 
LEMMA  1 [BARGAINED  WAGES].  Given the reservation income  I rU  of a STU 
worker and the asset values  S U  and  P U  of the LTU who prefer the active or the 
passive search strategy respectively, the agents negotiate the following inside and 
outside wages.  
(i)  The bargained inside wage at a match specific productivity  [] 1 , R x ∈  is  
() ( ) I I rU yx rU x w − + = β .        ( 2 3 )  
(ii)  A STU worker who makes a job-to-job transition and produces, in the initial 
period, with productivity  1 x =  receives the outside wage 
() 1 1 − − = ρ β I I V w w ,      (24) 
where  () 1 w  is the inside wage (23) for  1 = x , and  r + = − 1 1 ρ . 
(iii)  If the PES subsidises the training costs, a LTU worker with human capital 
P U  placed by the PES receives the outside wage  P w  with 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 − − − + − − = ρ β β I P P U U y z w w , for  H t ≤ ,    (25) 
where yz, with  1 ≤ z , is the flow output in the training period. 
 
If  P T t H ≤ ≤ , the outside wage  ) (t wP  in the training period is  
() ( ) 1 − − − = ρ β H t w t w P P .         ( 2 6 )  
(iv)  A LTU worker with human capital  S U  who finds a job through random 
search receives the outside wage  S w  if the PES subsidises his training costs: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − + − − = ρ β ρ β β P I S S QV U U y z w w , for  H t ι ≤ . (27) 
If the training costs exceed  H ι  the bargained wage is 
() ( ) 1 − − − = ρ ι β H t w t w S S , for  S T t H ≤ ≤ ι .     (28) 
As equation (23) shows, the inside wage equals the reservation income of the 
worker plus a share of the current match rent that depends on his bargaining 
strength β . As (19) shows, the value of the outside option  I V  diminishes the rent of 
a match with a STU worker, and, as a consequence, reduces the share of the cur-
rent rent (24) a STU worker can appropriate in the contract negotiation. The time of 
the model is discrete. While the reservation value of the vacancy refers to the be-
ginning of the period, wages are paid at the end;  I V , therefore, is discounted in (24)   16 
to the end of the period. The lower the productivity  1 ≤ z  of a LTU worker during the 
training period, the lower the bargained outside wages, as equations (25) and (27) 
show. Moreover, training costs higher than H are partially passed on to the worker, 
so that the outside wages (26) and (28) respectively fall monotonically with t. Fi-
nally, the outside wage of a LTU worker depends on the sign and the magnitude of 
the balance of the present values of a LTU and a STU worker,  I P U U − , as the 
wage equations (25) and (27) show. 
Two factors influence the differential rent  I P U U − . First, the employment service 
of the state agency is only available to the LTU, while the STU in view of the reac-
tion time of the PES either have to wait until the next period if they choose the pas-
sive search strategy, or to search by themselves. Therefore, the sign of the balance 
also depends on the search strategy the STU prefer. 
If  () U b UI + > ρ , then all STU workers immediately search for a new job. The 
number of active job seekers  I S  among the STU rises, the tightness  I θ  of the 
search market in the first round of the matching process diminishes, and the transi-
tion rate  I p  falls. The adjustment comes to an end either because the gains from 
private job search are driven to zero, as  () U b UI + = ρ , or because the total inflow 
searches randomly for a job, so that  I SI = . In the following, we look at the first case 
and assume that in equilibrium the gains from search vanish so that  () U b UI + = ρ  
and  I SI ≤ .  
If in equilibrium the STU are indifferent to the active and the passive search strat-
egy, then, the differential rent  I P U U −  is strictly positive and can be derived from 
the asset equation (17), the sharing rule (21), and equation (A1) for the option value 
P V  of a vacancy that, in view of the third round of the matching process, expects to 
meet a LTU worker placed by the PES:  
() ( )
() ( ) ( ) [] P S I
P S I
I P T F q q P










.     (29) 
If the STU are indifferent to both search strategies then the differential rent (29) is 
strictly positive. The reason for this is the reaction time of the PES: the PES is 
available to the LTU whereas it is not to the STU who have just lost their jobs; the 
STU must wait at least one period - after the PES has reviewed their claims, has 
registered and referred them to the job placement service - until the first job offer 
arrives. During this time, which we assume lasts one period, the STU have to rely 
on their own search efforts. The differential rent (29) increases together with the 
probability P for a contact via the PES, the reservation costs  P T , the probability 
() ( ) S I q q − − 1 1  of finding a job that is not yet filled by one of the active job seekers, 
and with the option value  P V .   17 
The LTU choose the active search strategy if  P S U U > . The number of active job 
seekers  S increases, the tightness  S θ  of the search market during the second 
round of the matching process decreases, and the contact probability  S p  dimin-
ishes until either all workers in the unemployment pool u search actively for a job, 
so that  u S = , or the gains from private job search vanish, so that  P S U U =  and 
u S ≤ . In the following, we investigate the second case and assume that, in equilib-
rium,  P S U U =  and  u S ≤ . With  P S U U = , the LTU are indifferent to the strategies 
of search, and from the wage equations (25) and (27) it follows for the outside wage 
of a random searcher among the LTU:  1 − − = ρ β P P S QV w w , for  H t ι ≤ .  
6. THE VALUE OF A FILLED JOB, WAGE DISPERSIONS AND JOB DESTRUCTION 
With the wage equations from Lemma 1, the asset equations from section 3, and 
the condition of the reservation productivity (4), we can now derive the value of a 
filled job. 
 
LEMMA 2 [FILLED JOBS]. (i) After the training period the continuation value of a 









β Π 1 .        ( 3 0 )  
(ii) Taking into account the reservation value  I V , a job filled by a STU worker has 
the present value 
() I I V β Π Π + = 1 ,      (31) 
where  () 1 Π  is the continuation value (30) for the match productivity  1 = x . 
(iii) A job filled by a LTU worker who is placed and whose training costs are sub-
sidised by the PES has the value  
( ) () () () ( ) I P P U U y z − − − − − − = β β ρ Π Π 1 1 1 1 , for  H t ≤ .   (32) 
A job filled by a subsidised LTU worker whose training costs exceed H has the 
present value  
( () ( ) H t t P P − + = β Π Π , for  P T t H ≤ ≤ .     (33) 
(iv) Since the job seekers are indifferent to the two search strategies, taking into 
account the reservation value  P QV , a job filled by a LTU worker who is actively 
searching has the asset price 
P P S QV β Π Π + = , for  H t ι ≤ .      ( 3 4 )  
For training costs t with  S T t H ≤ ≤ ι  we finally obtain   18 
() ( ) H t t S S ι β Π Π − + = .        ( 3 5 )  
From the value equations for the filled jobs, we can derive the reservation costs 
P T  and  S T . 
 
LEMMA 3 [RESERVATION COSTS]. (i) The reservation costs  P T  which are applied to 
the LTU who are placed by the PES follow from (33) together with 








.        ( 3 6 )  
From the value equations (33) - (35) and  () P S S S QV H T T − + = ι Π  we can derive 
the reservation costs for the method of random search 
() P P S QV H T T − − − = ι 1 .         ( 3 7 )  
(ii)  As a consequence of the fact that  () 0 1 > + − = − P S P QV H T T ι , the percent-
age of LTU who cannot be placed via the search market, is always higher than the 
percentage of LTU who cannot be placed via the PES:  () () P S T F T F − > − 1 1
6. 
 
The dispersions of the outside wages of the LTU during the training period de-
pend on the method of search and the distribution of the training costs. 
 
LEMMA 4 [WAGE DISPERSIONS]. (i) The dispersions of the outside wages of the 
LTU are defined on the ranges  () [] P P P w T w ,  and  () [] S S S w T w , , where  () i i T w  is the 
lowest and  i w  is the highest wage of the respective wage dispersion,  S P i , = . 
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, taking into account that in equilibrium  P S U U = , it 
follows that  () () S S P P T w T w =  and  0 1 > = −
− ρ β P S P QV w w . 
(ii) The average wages of the normalized dispersions are given by 
() ( ) P
T
H P P P T F t dF t w w H F w
P ] ) ( ) ( [ ∫ + =  and  () () S
T
H S S S T F t dF t w w H F w
S ] ) ( ) ( [ ∫ + =
ι ι . 
If the training costs are exponentially distributed, then  S P w w > . 
 
The job destruction rule can be derived by evaluating the asset equation (5) at 
the reservation threshold  R x = . Taking into account the wage equation (23) we 
obtain: 












.       ( 3 8 )  
                                            
6   With Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 the option values of a vacancy  P V  and  S V  are only functions of the 
subsidy limit H, the reservation costs  P T  and  S T , the tightness Θ , and the design  {} ι τ , 1 ∈  of 
the ALMP (s. App. AI).   19 
In order to close the model, we still have to determine the reservation income of a 
STU worker,  I rU , and the transition probabilities of the method of random search.  
In equilibrium the STU and the LTU, by assumption, are indifferent to the active 
and the passive search strategies so that  () U b UI + = ρ  and  U U U S P = = . With 
these assumptions, the reservation income of a STU worker is equal to the sum of 
the unemployment benefit and the increment in the value of his human capital at 
the point of transition to the state of the LTU: 
() I P I U U b rU − + = .        ( 3 9 )  
Taking account of the fact that job seekers are indifferent to the two search 
strategies, we finally obtain the transition probabilities generated by the search 
market,  () I p θ  and  () S p θ , as follows.  
 
LEMMA  5 [RANDOM  SEARCH]. (i) From the Bellman equation (15) and 
() U b UI + = ρ  it follows that, in equilibrium, the expected search costs of a STU 
worker who is randomly searching are equal to his share of the match rent, 
I I I I U W p c − = . From this, together with the sharing rule (19) and the asset equa-
tion (31), we obtain 













.       ( 4 0 )  
(ii) Using the assumption  U U U S P = =  and the asset equation (18), it follows 
that, in equilibrium, the expected search costs of a LTU worker who is randomly 
searching equal his expected share in the match rent: 
() ( ) ( ) () ∫ − + − = −
S T
H S S S S S I S t dF U t W U W H F p q c
ι ι ) ( ) 1 ( . From this equilibrium condi-
tion we obtain with respect to the sharing rule (20) and the option value (A2)  










θ θ 1 1
.     (41) 
The equilibrium of the search model consists of solutions 
() [] u T T R S P S I P , , , , , , , , 1 θ θ Θ Π Π  to the equations (A5) – (A12) in Appendix II and the 
equilibrium unemployment (3). The comparative static effects of the hiring subsidy 
are indeterminate as a consequence of the multiplicity of the channels through 
which ALMP work. Which effect dominates is an empirical question. We therefore 
have carried out a series of numerical experiments.    20 
7. SIMULATION 
Parameters and matching functions. The choice of the baseline parameter val-
ues, Table A1 in Appendix II, is made with respect to the design of the experiments 
of Mortensen/Pissarides (1999, 2001) and the restraint that in equilibrium the num-
ber of active job seekers,  I S  and S, have to be “interior solutions” to the model. 
The time period which corresponds to the duration of a model period is the yearly 
quarter. The bargaining power of the workers is  50 . 0 = β , the marginal product of a 
job at full productivity is  100 = y . During their training period, the LTU produce a 
marginal product of  60 = yz ; the value of leisure is  30 = l b , UI benefits are 
30 = U b , so that  60 = + ≡ U l b b b ; the real interest rate r is 2 %; the probability of a 
productivity shock  is 10 %; the search costs are  40 = I c  and  25 = S c , and the 
recruiting costs of a vacancy amount to  30 = k .  
The distribution function  () x G  of the productivity shocks is assumed to be uniform 
on [] 1 , α , with the lower support  65 . 0 = α . Training costs  0 ≥ t  are exponentially dis-
tributed with mean  15 1 = δ . 
The matching functions of the PES and the search market are of the Cobb Doug-
las type (Petrongolo/Pissarides 2001). For a given vacancy the probabilities of a 
contact with a job seeker are 
PES:                () ()
Φ Θ Θ
− ∗ =
1 1 ef Q     (42) 
Search market:                () ()
φ θ θ
− ∗ =
1 1 d q .   (43) 
The values of the "total factor productivities" of the basic scenario are 
30 . 0 = = d ef ; for the elasticities of the job matches M and m with respect to va-
cancies we use  5 4 = Φ  and  5 1 = φ  respectively. Thus, among the arguments of 
the matching technology of the PES, the vacancies dominate, while on the search 
market the active job seekers are the dominating input factor.  
Indicators. The following indicators are used to evaluate the simulations: (1) 
Quarterly unemployment rate U in percent; (2) quarterly unemployment incidence 
G λ  in percent; (3) unemployment duration of active and passive job seekers  S d  
and  P d  respectively in quarters; (4) fraction of active job seekers among the inflow-
ing STU,  100 ∗ I SI ; (5) fraction of active job seekers among the LTU,  100 ∗ u S ; 
(6) fraction of the STU making job-to-job transitions,  100 ∗ I S p I I ; (7) the outside 
wage  I w  negotiated by the STU making job-to-job transitions; (8) the indicator for 
the outside wages of the LTU, which equals the mean of the distribution of outside 
wages, s. Lemma 4, as a percentage of the outside wage of the STU, 
100 ∗ = I P w w wIP .  wIP − 100  denotes the average wage penalty which a LTU 
worker placed through the PES must accept due to his low productivity and the   21 
training costs. (9) fraction of the LTU,  () 100 1 ∗ − = u u LTU S ; (10) market share of 
the PES, PES (see App. II for a definition); (11) UI benefits as a percentage of the 
net product,  100 ∗ = np b u PLMP U . The net product is 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) [] R G G x dG x y u np
R − − = ∫ 1 1
1
, where the term () y u − 1 , which denotes the net 
product for  1 = x , is weighted with the conditional expected value of the productivity 
parameter  R x ≥ . (12) Expenses of the PES for active labour market policies in per-
cent of the net product, ALMP (s. App. II). 
The results of the simulation with the limit H on the hiring subsidy are shown 
graphically in the Appendices III – V. We distinguish between an ALMP design 
which supports only placements through the PES (regime  0 = ι ) and a policy which 
gives equal support to both search methods (regime  1 = ι ). Appendix III shows the 
results for both regimes ( 0 = ι  and  1 = ι ) with the baseline parameter values from 
Tab. A1. Appendix IV describes the results for  0 = ι  at different values for the 
workers' bargaining strength ( 45 . 0 = β  and  55 . 0 = β ). Appendix V depicts the re-
sults for  0 = ι  at varying values for the matching productivity of the PES 
( 25 . 0 = ef and  35 . 0 = ef ). The App. IV und V show clearly that the results 1 – 4 are 
also stable with shocks which affect central model parameters. Moreover, App. IV 
und V show additional results which are based on the effects of the policy parame-
ter ef and the structural parameter of the wage bargaining system β  
7.  
Result 1. The three figures, App. III – V, show that consistent with 
Mortensen/Pissarides (1999, 2001) the hiring subsidy increases the equilib-
rium rate of unemployment U.  
For example in the regime  0 = ι , where only PES placements are subsidised U 
increases from 7,4% ( 0 = H ) to 8,4% ( 30 = H ). In comparison: in the year 2000 the 
rate of unemployment in the OECD was in total 6.4% and in the EU 8.3%. 
In the standard model of Mortensen/Pissarides the hiring subsidy lowers the 
costs of job creation, so that on the one hand job creation is stimulated and the du-
ration of unemployment falls. On the other hand the unemployment incidence in-
creases. Because of the increasing tightness the opportunity costs of a filled job 
rise and the match partners separate faster. The second effect outweighs the first 
so that overall employment decreases. 
In our model three factors have an affect on equilibrium unemployment. First the 
incidence, second the duration of the unemployment spell and third the fraction of 
passive job seekers. If the fraction of passive job seekers rises then, ceteris pari-
bus, unemployment increases because the passive seekers are unemployed for at 
least one period longer than the active seekers:  S P d d + >1 . 
                                            
7   The following comparative data are taken from the OECD (2001 a,b)    22 
The main causes for the positive correlation between ALMP and the unemploy-
ment rate in our model are the following. First, firms and worker only enjoy the 
benefits of the hiring subsidy if they are matched by the PES (regime  0 = ι ). The 
hiring subsidy therefore increases the opportunity costs of a start-up in the first and 
second phase of the search process. The consequences are that the fractions of 
active job seekers,  100 ∗ I SI  and  100 * /u S , fall or that the fractions of those STU 
and LTU who prefer to wait for a placement through the PES increase. Second, the 
hiring subsidy reduces duration but only the duration of the active job seekers,  S d , 
while the average spell length  P d  of an unemployed worker who decides on the 
passive search strategy increases. The reason for this is that the growing number 
of passive job seekers is concentrated in the third phase of the matching process. 
As a result the tightness between the registers of the PES decreases, the time 
) ( / 1 1 Θ P + , which elapses until the first job offer of the PES is made rises and the 
probability of a successful match falls. It is not surprising that the duration of the 
unemployment spell of the active job seeker falls because, on the one hand, the 
supply of vacancies rises due to the hiring subsidy and, on the other hand, the 
number of active job seekers falls.  
ALMP thus increases not only the job destruction rate but also the duration of the 
unemployment spell of passive job seekers as well as their fraction of all unem-
ployed. 
The development of the fraction of the LTU who are randomly searching depends 
on the design of the ALMP. In the regime  0 = ι , where only PES placements are 
subsidised, the fraction of active job seekers among the LTU decreases. As a result 
the fraction of passive job seekers rises in  0 = ι  not only among the STU but also 
among the LTU.  
Result 2. Although the hiring subsidy raises the fraction of active job seek-
ers among the LTU and their duration  S d  falls, the symmetrical labour market 
policy ( 1 = ι ) lowers overall employment,. However the symmetrical ALMP 
leads to a crowding-out of active job seekers among the STU and reduces the 
job-to-job transitions even below the level reached in the regime  0 = ι . As in 
0 = ι   P d  increases and because the second effect outweighs the first unem-
ployment rises. Nevertheless, due to the growing number of active job seekers 
among the LTU, the equilibrium rate of unemployment does not increase as 
much as it does in the regime  0 = ι . 
Result 3. (1) In addition the fraction of the LTU (in  0 = ι ) – in the model 
those are the LTU who are unemployed for longer than 3 months (1 quarter) – 
increases from 72.0 % ( 0 = H ) to 73.6 % ( 30 = H ). (2) The costs for PLMP 
increase from 2.7 % ( 0 = H ) to 3.1 % ( 30 = H ) of the net product, while the 
costs for ALMP ( 30 = H ) reach the value of 0.3 % of the net product.   23 
In comparison: in the year 2000 the incidence of “long-term unemployed” (3 
months and over) was 65.3 % of total unemployment in the OECD and 75.6 % in 
the EU. Moreover, in 1999 the average OECD member incurred costs for UI bene-
fits of 1.0 % of the GDP as well as costs for “subsidies to regular employment in the 
private sector” of 0.1 % of the GDP. 
Result 4. Without ALMP ( 0 = H ) the LTU placed through the PES must ac-
cept on average a 5.6 % wage penalty compared to a STU worker when mak-
ing a job-to-job transition. ALMP ( 30 = H ) turn this penalty into an advantage 
of 3.5 % for the LTU under the regime  0 = ι .  
In comparison: based on the first seven rounds of the British Household Panel 
Survey, Arulampalam (2001) estimates that, after an unemployment spell, a worker 
must accept a wage penalty of 5.7 % compared to making a job-to-job transition
8. 
The App. IV und V show clearly that the results 1 – 4 are also stable with shocks, 
which affect central model parameters. In addition the graphs depict two further in-
teresting effects.  
Result 5. The more effective the matching service of the PES – measured 
by the total factor productivity ef of the PES matching function under the re-
gime  0 = ι  – the higher equilibrium unemployment is.  
The reasons are ( 0 = H ): first the more effective job placement service of the 
PES raises the opportunity costs of the filled jobs and therefore the incidence: 
While a job with  30 . 0 = ef  has a mean life span of  36 100 * ) ( 1 = R G λ  quarters or 
9.0 years, the life span falls to 8.2 years for  35 . 0 = ef . Second, the fraction of acti-
ve job seekers among the STU and thus the fraction of the STU making job-to-job 
transitions decreases with increasing ef. Third, even though the higher productivity 
of the PES lowers the unemployment duration of both search strategies – for the 
passive strategy the duration falls from 5 to 4.8 quarters, for the active from 1 to 0.9 
quarters – the first two negative effects outweigh the positive third effect. Why does 
the duration of the unemployment spells decrease? The fact that  P d  falls is obvi-
ously due to the higher productivity of the PES which has the effect that the time 
lapse between two job offers is reduced. The decrease of  S d  results from the re-
duction in the number of the active job seekers among the LTU. This improves the 
chances of the remaining active searchers who stick to their search strategy.  
Of course the fraction of PES matches, and thus the success which the PES will 
claim, grows with the effectiveness of its placement service. 
Result 6. The increase in the bargaining power of the workers as shown in 
App. V from  50 . 0 = β  to  55 . 0 = β  lowers the life expectancy of a job from 9.0 
to 8.7 years and increases the duration of the unemployment spells – the du-
                                            
8   This wage penalty increases to 14 % in the fourth year after the unemployment spell and then 
decreases again (Arulampalam 2001).   24 
ration rises by about 18 days:  P d  increases from 5.0 to 5.2 quarters and  S d  
from 1 to 1.2 quarters. Although the life expectancy of a job falls and the dura-
tion of an unemployment spell rises overall employment increases.  
Why? First, the higher bargaining power of the workers increases the share of the 
match rent appropriated by the applicants who are actively searching and de-
creases the profit share of the firms. Second, firms react to the smaller profit share 
with a lower supply of vacancies, the transition rates of the unemployed decrease 
and, therefore, durations increase. Third, because of the increasing gains from ac-
tive job search the fraction of active job seekers among the STU and the LTU as 
well as the proportion of job-to-job transitions grow. Because the duration of the un-
employment spell of the active job seekers is about 1 year less than the unemploy-
ment duration of the passive unemployed,  4 = − S P d d  ( 0 = H ), equilibrium unem-
ployment decreases, even though the incidence and the duration increase. 
8. SUMMARY 
This paper presents a search model in discrete time. Job seekers can choose be-
tween two methods of search, matching through the PES, where firms register their 
vacancies, and random search on the search market, where firms advertise vacan-
cies. The matching process includes three rounds. In the first only the active job 
seekers among the STU search randomly for a vacancy. The STU have lost their 
job at the end of the previous period and, therefore, of all the unemployed possess 
the best information about current labour market conditions. Their applications are 
more targeted and reach the firms earlier than the applications of all the other un-
employed. In the second round the active job seekers among the LTU apply for 
jobs, and finally, in the third round, also those LTU who are sent by the PES. Firms 
prefer applications from the STU, not only because they arrive first, but also be-
cause unlike the LTU they immediately work with full productivity and do not gener-
ate training costs. The PES subsidises the training costs with a hiring subsidy. Two 
regimes are compared. Under one regime only the matches created by the PES are 
subsidised, under the other the subsidy is paid for each match with a LTU worker, 
irrespective of the method of search. Under both regimes the unemployment rate 
increases with an increasing hiring subsidy. The reasons are the increasing job de-
struction rate, the decreasing fraction of active job seekers among the STU and of 
job-to-job transitions, and the increasing duration of unemployment of the passive 
job seekers. 
In contrast to the standard search model, the ratio of active job seekers is en-
dogenous in our model. Therefore, an increase in the bargaining strength of the job 
seekers has three consequences. First, as in the standard model, the share of the   25 
match rent appropriated by the workers increases, while the profit share decreases. 
As a consequence the job destruction rate increases and the supply of vacancies is 
reduced. Second, a lower supply of vacancies reduces the transition rates into em-
ployment and durations grow. Third, the fact that unemployment does not increase 
but decreases is a consequence of the growing rate of active job seekers and of the 
fact that active in comparison with passive job seekers have a much shorter unem-
ployment duration. The reason that the unemployed switch to the active search 
strategy and that the rate of passive job seekers falls is, naturally, the higher share 
of the match rent and the higher wages. 
Of course, the PES can increase its placement success by improving the effec-
tiveness of its matching service. Nevertheless, the job destruction rate will increase 
and the fraction of active job seekers among the STU will decrease so that the im-
proved effectiveness of the PES will lead to an increase in equilibrium unemploy-
ment, although the unemployment duration for both groups of jobseekers, the pas-
sive and the active, is reduced.  
The economic policy consequences of the model are clear: the effects of ALMP 
and profiling techniques to increase the effectiveness of the state placement service 
depend on the target group they are geared towards. First, for skill groups, who 
have relatively low private search costs in comparison with their productivity, not 
only the policy instruments of ALMP but also the actual job placement activities of 
the PES are counterproductive and reduce overall employment. Second, the in-
struments of ALMP and the placement service of the PES only have a stimulating 
effect in job creation for target groups with such high private search costs that in 
equilibrium without policy it is not worthwhile for these groups to actively search for 
a job. 
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APPENDIX I 
Option values  P V  and  S V . 1. When firms decide whether to offer a vacancy they 
only know the c.d.f. of the training costs  () t F , the reservation costs  i T  and the con-
ditions for PES subsidies  {} ι τ , 1 ∈ . Before the training costs are revealed the asset 
value of a vacancy expecting a contact with a LTU worker placed by the PES is 




P P t dF t H t t dF V Π Π
0 .       ( A 1 )  
If the training costs of the LTU are fully subsidised, the job has the value  P Π . 
The second term in (A1) denotes the expected value of the job if the training costs 
are higher than the subsidy limit H but below the reservation costs  P T . Finally, if the 
training costs exceed  P T , the match partners separate immediately. Analogously, 
before training costs are known the conditional option value of a vacancy that 
meets an active job seeker among the LTU is 







S S ∫ ∫ ∫
∞
+ − + + =
ι
ι
ι Π Π ) (
0 ,   (A2) 
If the match specific training costs of the job seeker exceed  S T , the agents sepa-
rate and, in view of the third round of the matching process, the vacancy takes on 
the value of the outside option  P QV . 
 
2. With respect to the asset equations (32) – (35) and Lemma 3 the option values 
(A1) and (A2) of a vacancy transform to 
() () ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 


 − + − − = ∫
P T
H P P P P t dF t T H T H F H T V β 1 ,  and              (A3) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) H T V Q t dF t T H T H F H T T V P P
T
H S S S P S
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APPENDIX II 
The model equations in implicit form are:  
() () ( ) ( ) 0
1






y H T T R J S P S I P λ
β Π θ θ Θ Π Π      ( A 5 )  
() () ( ) ( ) () ( )
() ( ) ( ) () 0 ,
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 2 =
− − −
− −
− − − − − ≡ ⋅ H T V
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Π β ρ Π  (A6) 
() ( ) ( ) 0 1 3 = − − − ≡ ⋅ H T J P P β Π           ( A 7 )  
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, , , , , 4 = − − −
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() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 6 = − − − − ≡ ⋅ H T V Q H T T J P P S P Θ ι        ( A 1 0 )  
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Tab. A1: The baseline parameter of the model 
β  r  λ  y  z  b  U b   k  I c   S c   δ 1  α   ef  d  Φ  φ 
0.50  0.02  0.10  100  0.60  60  30  30  40  25  15  0.65  0.30  0.30  5 / 4   5 / 1  
 
The indicators PES and ALMP are defined as follows: 
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APPENDIX IV BARGAINING STRENGTH (ι  = 0) 
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APPENDIX V EFFICIENCY (ι  = 0) 
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